“We have to be willing to consider stimulants as an option because we are not correcting students' disadvantages in other, more traditional ways,” writes Ray (2016), pointing out how limited and in...

Revelation, primarily a liturgical book, invites its readers to sing, to pray, and to praise God; and those who attempt to preach or teach its themes apart from a liturgical setting rob it of much of its power.

When occasion, text, and sermon are merged, then the text interprets the listeners and the listeners interpret the text.

Every preacher knows one ought not collapse the distance hetween the biblical text and our modern world—hence the discomfort in reading this letter as one wonders what happened to the nineteen centuries, and to the light-years of progress, that ought to lie between the text and us.

The authors examined the effects of ethical leadership on follower organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) and deviant behavior. Drawing upon research related to the behavioral plasticity hypothesis, the authors examined a moderating role of follower self-esteem in these relationships. Results from a field study revealed that ethical leadership is positively related to follower OCB and negatively related to deviance. We found that these relationships are moderated by followers' self-esteem, such that the relationships between ethical leadership and OCB as well as between (...) ethical leadership and deviant behavior are weaker when followers' self-esteem is high than low. Implications of these findings for research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better if we were immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Life, Death, and Meaning brings together key readings, primarily by English-speaking philosophers, on such 'big questions.'.

Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better to be immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Since Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions first appeared, David Benatar's distinctive anthology designed to introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy has won a devoted following among users in a variety of upper-level and even introductory courses.

Several years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act utilitarian l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a simple and relatively uncontrover sial argument that showed, with only some trivial (...) assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then, obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A & B). (shrink)

What makes a life go well for the one who lives it? Hedonists hold that pleasure enhances the value of a life; pain diminishes it. Hedonism has been subjected to a number of objections. Some are (a) based on the claim that hedonism is a form of “mental statism”. Others are (b) based on the claim that some pleasures are base or degrading. Yet others are (c) based on the claim that when a bad person enjoys a pleasure, his receipt (...) of that pleasure seem not to make the world better.It is important to keep in mind that hedonism is a theory about the value of a person's life for the person who lives it, and not for the world or for others. It is also important to distinguish between sensory hedonism and attitudinal hedonism.“Desert Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism” appears to be immune to objections (a) and (b). A variant appears to be immune to all of them. Perhaps it is the answer to the question about the value of a life. (shrink)

Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Brentano, Moore, and Chisholm have suggested marks or criteria of intrinsic goodness. I distinguish among eight of these. I focus in this paper on four: (a) unimprovability, (b) unqualifiedness, (c) dependence upon intrinsic natures, and (d) incorruptibility. I try to show that each of these is problematic in some way. I also try to show that they are not equivalent – they point toward distinct conceptions of intrinsic goodness. In the end it appears that none of them (...) is fully satisfactory. Insofar as none of these succeeds, a fundamental problem remains for those who make use of the concept of intrinsic value. Precisely what do we have in mind when we say that some sort of value is intrinsic? (shrink)

Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Brentano, Moore, and Chisholm have suggested ’’marks‘‘ or criteria of intrinsic goodness. I distinguish among eight of these. I focus in this paper on four: (a) unimprovability, (b) unqualifiedness, (c) dependence upon intrinsic natures, and (d) incorruptibility. I try to show that each of these is problematic in some way. I also try to show that they are not equivalent – they point toward distinct conceptions of intrinsic goodness. In the end it appears that none of them (...) is fully satisfactory. Insofar as none of these succeeds, a fundamental problem remains for those who make use of the concept of intrinsic value. Precisely what do we have in mind when we say that some sort of value is “intrinsic”? (shrink)

This article argues that new (and sometimes invisible) forms of civic protest are finding a voice in the age of the Internet. It poses the questions whether these voices of protest are (a) part of a long, militant and sometimes violent tradition of street politics based on class struggle or (b) new, peaceful and creative political (and anti-political) platforms (a metaphysical revolt) offering critical and innovative insights into the possibilities of democratic renewal - as part of a process of deepening (...) democracy into more ethical and participatory forms.En este artículo se argumenta que las nuevas (y a veces invisibles) formas de protesta cívica están encontrando voz en la era de internet. Se plantea la cuestión de si estas voces de protesta son (a) parte de una larga, militante y, en ocasiones, violenta tradición de política de la calle basada en la lucha de clases o bien (b) nuevas, pacíficas y creativas plataformas (una revuelta metafísica) políticas (y antipolítica), que ofrece una perspectiva innovadora y crítica respecto a las posibilidades de renovación democrática, como parte de un proceso de profundización de la democracia en formas más éticas y participativas. (shrink)

Passages in Leibniz which have been understood to contain his statement of Leibniz law do not in fact contain any statement of that principle. Some of these passages contain a statement of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, While others contain a statement of a principle about concept identity. The latter principle states that a concept, A, Is identical with a concept, B, If and only if a can be substituted for b in any proposition without change of truth (...) value. (shrink)

A non-monotonic theory of probability is put forward and shown to have applicability in the quantum domain. It is obtained simply by replacing Kolmogorov's positivity axiom, which places the lower bound for probabilities at zero, with an axiom that reduces that lower bound to minus one. Kolmogorov's theory of probability is monotonic, meaning that the probability of A is less then or equal to that of B whenever A entails B. The new theory violates monotonicity, as its name suggests; yet, (...) many standard theorems are also theorems of the new theory since Kolmogorov's other axioms are retained. What is of particular interest is that the new theory can accommodate quantum phenomena (photon polarization experiments) while preserving Boolean operations, unlike Kolmogorov's theory. Although non-standard notions of probability have been discussed extensively in the physics literature, they have received very little attention in the philosophical literature. One likely explanation for that difference is that their applicability is typically demonstrated in esoteric settings that involve technical complications. That barrier is effectively removed for non-monotonic probability theory by providing it with a homely setting in the quantum domain. Although the initial steps taken in this paper are quite substantial, there is much else to be done, such as demonstrating the applicability of non-monotonic probability theory to other quantum systems and elaborating the interpretive framework that is provisionally put forward here. Such matters will be developed in other works. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume on the Abstract Idea of Existence: Comments on Cummins' "Hume on the Idea of Existence"1 Fred Wilson Hume'sviews on theconceptofexistence: thisisone ofthemore obscure parts of Hume's philosophy. Professor Cummins has done a valuable service simply by trying to unravel some ofthe puzzles; it is still more valuable for shedding as much light as it does on the issues. There are nonetheless problems with the interpretation that he (...) develops, and I would like to bring out some ofthese. I will address three questions: (a)What, more precisely, is the (abstract) idea ofexistence? (b)What is the notion of"necessity" as Hume would use it in connection with the notion that something exists "necessarily," or, contrarily, "contingently"? (c)Does it follow from the fact that whatever thing we conceive we conceive as existent that every thing necessarily exists? In order toanswerthese questions somethingwillhave tobe said about Hume's doctrine ofabstractideas. Butonall theseissues, Humeis often not so much inadequate as incomplete; and I shall suggest that a numberofpoints canbeilluminatedbylookingatthe historical context that Hume himselfcould take for granted. The upshot will not be that Hume's views are unproblematic, but only that they are perhaps less problematic than Professor Cummins makes out. I. Abstract Ideas In many respects, Hume's doctrine of ideas is fairly traditional. We think in terms ofideas. In particular, our capacity to think generally, and to use general terms, is a matter ofhaving abstract ideas. In this, Hume follows the views ofhis predecessors such as Locke, Descartes and the Port Royal logicians. Hume also adopts the principle that what is conceivable is possible. Again, he follows the same tradition ofLocke, Volume XVII Number 2 167 FRED WILSON Descartes and the Port Royal logicians. Where Hume differs from his predecessors is in his account of what precisely an abstract is. For Hume's predecessors, one forms an abstract idea by separation. Thus, for Locke, forming ideas by abstraction consists in "separating them from all other Ideas that accompany them in their real existence."2 This sortofseparation is the mechanism bywhich "the Mind makes the particular Ideas, received from particular Objects, to become general" (Essay, 2.11.9). The Port Royal logicians make the same point: abstraction occurs with respect to "choses... composées" when one "les considérant par parties, et comme par les diverses faces qu'elles peuvent recevoir." In abstraction what is thus known is considered separately from the whole; either one considers "les parties séparément" in the case of"parties intégrantes," or one "peut séparer les choses en divers modes," or, finally, "quand une même chose ayant divers attributs, on pense à l'un sans penser à l'autre."3 The former occurs when, for example, we separate in thought the parts ofthe body. Thisis the simplestform ofabstraction. Berkeleyhas noproblems with this notion: "Iwill notdenyI can abstract, ifthatmay properlybe called abstraction, which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects, as is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder."4 Neither does Hume have problems with this notion; it is the basis of his—and Berkeley's—view that ideas are either simple or complex and that some of the complex ideas are a result of our combining simple parts in ways that are not found in reality, as, for example, in our idea ofthe New Jerusalem.5 It is the other two sorts ofabstraction that are more problematic. Consider the first of these two forms of abstraction. We begin with simple ideas ofsensation, for example, white (Essay, 2.3.1). One forms the abstract idea of white by separating the property white from the other qualities with which it is conjoined in the white particulars, for example, snow or milk (Essay, 2.21.73), that are given in sense experience. The resultingideais distinct from other ideas, for example, blue or heat (Essay, 2.12.1). The example given by Nicole and Arnauld is thatofthe geometers who explore the idea ofthree-dimensional space by considering first length alone, then area, and finally volumes or solids (which is the same, for these Cartesians as "corps," body) (Logique, 1.5). This is one form ofseparation. By this means one forms abstract... (shrink)

Let α be any countable admissible ordinal greater than ω. There is a transitive set A such that A is admissible, locally countable, On A = α, and A satisfies Σ 1 -separation. In fact, if B is any nonstandard model of $KP + \forall x \subseteq \omega$ (the hyperjump of x exists), the ordinal standard part of B is greater than ω, and every standard ordinal in B is countable in B, then HC B ∩ (standard part of B) (...) satisfies Σ 1 -separation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IS THERE A PRUSSIAN HUME? or How Far Is It from Könisberg to Edinburgh! Lewis White Beck has recently argued that Hume, in spite of his empiricist commitment, implicitly recognized the limitations of that position when he incorporated in his thinking ideas that are essentially Kantian and incompatible with his official empiricism. Beck is not, of course, the first so to argue; Robert Paul Wolff made a 2 similar (...) claim some years ago in a well-known paper. Wolff's case has, however, been challenged, and it is the aim of the present paper to challenge Beck's somev.'hat different case. 4 Beck argues that Hume has two causal principles: (1)Every event has a cause (2)Same cause, same effect the second of which he claims Hume defends, and the first of which he claims Hume does not defend. He then turns to the case of perception, where we observe an object once intermittently and once continuously. The result is a gappy series of impressions in the first case, and a non-gappy one in the second. The existence of the gap falsifies principles (1) and (2). In order to save principle (2), Beck argues, Hume relies on principle (1). The latter enables Hume to "feign" unobserved events to fill the gap. But (1) is also falsified by the empirical data, that is, the existence of the gap. So this appeal to (1) is illegitimate. At least it is illegitimate if the only support we are permitted to use is observational data. And that is all that the official Hume, committed to empiricism, is permitted to use. However, Hume does use (1), contrary to what his official position allows. This suggests that he recognizes, what Kant explicitly argued, that there are non-empirical reasons justifying the acceptance of (1). And it is here that we see the Prussian aspects of the Scots sceptic. Beck's case depends upon three points: (a)He must separate principles (1) and (2). (b)He must argue that gappy series of impressions are filled by appealing to (1). (c)He must argue that gappy series of impressions falsify (1), rendering its use to fill those gaps illegitimately. In what follows it is argued that the distance from Königsberg to Edinburgh cannot thus be bridged. Specifically, it is argued, first, that (a) is false, or, more specifically that for Hume (2) entails (1) ; second, that, when (1) and (2) are so understood, then (b) is partially correct; and third, that, when (1) and (2) are taken as Hume takes them, then (c) is incorrect: the gaps do not falsify (1), its use remains legitimate. Let us begin with principle (2), the "same cause, same effect" principle. This principle is Rule 4 of Hume's rules by which to judge of causes and effects. He states it as The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises hut from the same cause. (T173) Rules 1-3 give the analysis of the causal relation insofar as it is an ob8 jective relation among things. Rule 4 then makes a claim about events and causes. Rule 4 is followed by four rules which are the best statement of Mill's Methods of eliminative induction prior to Herschell's Preliminary Discourse. When one of these methods is used, the data eliminate all possible hypotheses but one, and the conclusion is that this uneliminated hypothesis must be true, correctly describing the relevant causal relation. Hume carefully points out that we draw this conclusion not from the data alone, but 3. also from the "same cause, same effect" principle. Thus, when Hume states Rule 5, the method of agreement, he writes There is another principle, which hangs upon this [i.e., upon Rule 4, "same cause, same effect"], viz. that where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst them. For as_ like effects imply like causes, we must always ascribe the causation to the circumstance, wherein we discover the resemblance. (T174, italics added) We can bring out the logic of the situation if we translate this into the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Appreciating Susan SontagFred RushMuch education from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s was self-education. Although one might happen to take a university course that incorporated contemporary art and criticism, it was a rarity. More often one supplemented university fare with one's own reading, listening, and viewing of cutting-edge art, anthropology, music, philosophy, linguistics, etc. Susan Sontag was for many Americans of that time a preeminent guide in this process, opening (...) doors to some of the most interesting and influential European work in art and criticism. Sontag's essayistic output—and she was one of the supreme writers in that genre—was seminal. Any sociologist or intellectual historian of the period would have to take her work greatly into account. Her incisive takes on her subject matter were not for everyone. Although trained as a philosopher at the then epicenter of the Anglophone philosophical world, Harvard, she did not tiptoe through academic complexities and was, therefore, decidedly out of step with the philosophical temperament of that time. She strode in, proselytized for her favorites, excoriated her enemies, and left no one in the room ignorant of the fact that she had been there, dominated the conversation and, on the way out, rearranged the furniture.Sontag's views generally have not received much philosophical attention. Even those who prize her critical work have tended to sell short the early, programmatic essays like "Against Interpretation" and "On Style." Perhaps this neglect is self-wrought. Sontag is often at her best when engaged in what one might call first-order criticism, that is, criticism of particular works of art on their own terms. Her work in critical theory tends to be both abstracting and declamatory and, so, operates against her strong suit. Moreover, Sontag's theory of criticism commits her to [End Page 36] the precedence of critical practice over theorizing. Accordingly, she is led to reduce the importance of those early essays. Yet this is where the interest of philosopher will fall, if indeed it falls at all.Sontag's main concern relevant to the philosophy of literature and to aesthetic theory more broadly is what she takes to be the colonization of aesthetic and critical response by what she terms "theory." Critical response is always, to some degree theoretical of course, so her point cannot be one that is ascribed sometimes to her, i.e., that critical response is supposed to be non-theoretical tout court. An "erotics of art," the famous formula contained in the last sentence of "Against Interpretation," is after all an erotics, which was in the ancient world a genre of theoretical investigation, not erotic experience or even erotica. Criticism can be theoretical in many senses as well. By itself the term "theory" does not rule out much unless one appends to it constraints having to do with the internal structure of bodies of knowledge that either qualify or disqualify them as theories correctly so-called. Sontag seems most concerned about two aspects of theoretical accounts of art: (A) their systematicity and (B) their use of modes of interpretation that undercut the aesthetic nature of works. With regard to (B), she is wary particularly of accounts of literary value that appeal to unconscious or subterranean social forces as determinative of meanings of works. The problem with (A) is that systematicity, she claims, tends toward exclusion and reduction, destroying the particularity of individual works.These two contentions comprise the diagnostic and negative side of Sontag's programmatic work in literary theory, i.e., what is to be avoided in one's experience and judgment of art. What is to be avoided is "interpretation," but what is interpretation exactly? What is the scope of Sontag's claim against it? Do her early essays provide a stable, convincing account of the relation between theory, on the one hand, and experience and criticism, on the other? Is she caught between formalism and a more politically engaged kind of criticism? On the positive side, what kind of critical response to literature is appropriate to its aesthetic nature? Is Sontag's replacement for interpretation viable? Sontag presents her answers to the first set of questions in an unstructured... (shrink)

In previous work, a non-standard theory of probability was formulated and used to systematize interference effects involving the simplest type of quantum systems. The main result here is a self-contained, non-trivial generalization of that theory to capture interference effects involving a much broader range of quantum systems. The discussion also focuses on interpretive matters having to do with the actual/virtual distinction, non-locality, and conditional probabilities.

Beginning with his work in the mid-1930s, Heidegger's later thought is generally considered to pose severe interpretative difficulties, even for those well acquainted with Being and Time. It is often claimed that his later thought either defies reconstruction because of its arcane nature or that it should not be reconstructed because doing so compromises its subtleties. It is argued that this 'availability problem' with Heidegger's later thought is not insurmountable, at least not with regard to one of its major strands, (...) his views on the relation of art to truth. An interpretation of 'The Origin of the Work of Art' is proposed that views its major arguments as extensions of Heidegger's view on truth and the nature of worlds in Being and Time. To this end, a new account of the relationship of two pairs of terms crucial to the understanding of the ontological significance of the work of art and its truth is offered: (a) 'earth' and 'world' and (b) 'concealment' and 'un-concealment'. What emerges is a Kant-like claim that a necessary condition for the possibility of worlds is that things stand to be taken up into worlds in virtue of a character they have abstracted from their involvements in any one world. Artworks, if they are 'true' art, show this by allowing the thing that they are to support a wide range of possible understandings, displaying the fact that no one set of understandings can exhaust the 'thingly' nature of the work. In addition to clarifying that aspect of Heidegger's account of truth that requires un-concealment to depend on residual concealment, this understanding of the structure of the artwork accounts for the power Heidegger ascribes to certain art to inaugurate worlds. I conclude by making some suggestions, against the background of the interpretation of the art essay, on how to understand the 'turn' in Heidegger's thought as a deepening inquiry into the nature of truth. (shrink)

If television news viewers are conceived as active audience members, their interpretations should be a crucial factor in the study of the ‘effects’ of television news. Here, viewers’ interpretations are understood as subjective constructions of a news item. In a previous contribution, we argued that interpretations can vary both within and between viewers in regard to the level of complexity. Complexity is the degree to which interpretations are a) differentiated, and b) integrated. In this contribution, we will operationalize the concept (...) of differentiation of television news interpretations by its viewers. Furthermore, we will present a procedure for measuring differentiation based on the thoughts viewers reported while they watched a television news program. Results of a small-scale study provided first indications that the procedure is able to discriminate between viewers with varying levels of differentiation in interpreting television news. (shrink)